Putin’s Delhi visit: Payments, people, new trade routes and a friendship built on trust. Read how the Modi-Jaishankar doctrine is at play in a multipolar world

Tomorrow, New Delhi will host one of the most anticipated visits of the year. At Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s invitation, Russian President Vladimir Putin will attend the 23rd India-Russia Annual Summit on December 4-5, 2025, resuming the in person annual summit format after four years and a full-scale conflict with Ukraine. The visit has been formally announced by India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), which defines it as an occasion to review the “Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership” and exchange views on regional and global concerns.

Most swift evaluations will reduce this conference to three clichés being S-400 missiles, Su-57 fighter jets, and discounted Russian oil. The amount of crude that has reached Indian ports since 2022 and India’s reliance on Russian weapons will be the subject of countless graphics. That’s all important. However, this does not fully explain why this visit is of such importance for Moscow, so sensitive for Washington and Brussels, and so beneficial for New Delhi.

In the background, the Modi–Jaishankar doctrine is evident. Multi-alignment, not non-alignment, strategic autonomy without yelling anti-West slogans, and a determined unwillingness to let either Washington or Beijing dictate whom India may cooperate with. This is as much about avoiding overdependence on China as it is about rejecting Western pressure.

What follows is a thorough dive into the “under the radar” agenda for tomorrow’s meetings i.e the payments, people and paths that will silently redefine what India–Russia ties mean in the coming decade.

A summit under pressure and a very public show of spine

This is not a usual summit season. The visit comes after US President Donald Trump put high tariffs on a broad basket of Indian goods, with American criticism openly tying that pressure to New Delhi’s decision to keep buying Russian oil and retain security ties with Moscow. The tariffs have been portrayed as part of a larger effort to drive India away from Russia by the Trump administration.

European diplomacy has been equally blatant. Just days before Putin’s arrival, the ambassadors of the UK, France and Germany co-authored an oped in an Indian newspaper severely criticizing Russia’s conduct in Ukraine and urged New Delhi to ‘do more.’  

The MEA broke its normal silence and openly described the approach as “unusual” and “not acceptable diplomatic practice,” emphasizing that India does not enjoy being lectured on the eve of a big bilateral engagement.

On the Russian side, the messaging has been similarly pointed. The Kremlin has confirmed the dates of the visit and constantly stressed that India is a “key strategic partner”. Putin told Russian media that Moscow wants to “elevate cooperation with India and China to a qualitatively new level”, a rare public pairing of the two Asian giants in his pre-visit statements.

Dmitry Peskov, spokesman for the Kremlin, has gone further, claiming that Western sanctions on Russian shipping and oil are “illegitimate” and emphasizing that Moscow and Delhi are developing ways to maintain trade “without influence of third countries”, a diplomatic term for avoiding Western financial levers.

In this tense backdrop, the optics of tomorrow’s summit matter. For Western observers, Modi receiving Putin while tariffs, Ukraine and sanctions dominate headlines is uncomfortable. For Beijing, the fact that Russia is not fully locked into a China only embrace is also a difficulty. For Delhi, however, this is exactly the point: India will talk to every major pole the US, the EU, Russia, Japan, the Gulf, ASEAN but it will not allow any one bloc to veto its engagement with another.

Rewiring the money pipes: RuPay-MIR, UPI-SBP and the sanctions proof agenda

The most significant “non-defence” file on the table is arguably payments and financial plumbing. Without resilient payment methods, no amount of political goodwill or energy discounts will matter.

Since 2022, India and Russia have experimented with rupee-rouble settlement, Special Rupee Vostro Accounts (SRVAs), and bank-to-bank agreements that circumvent Western institutions in an effort to maintain trade despite the sanctions. These systems have kept trade alive but remain clumsy and unequal. Indian exporters complain of delayed payments and imprecise FX conversions. Russian businesses are trapped with significant rupee balances in Indian banks that they struggle to spend. A second-generation strategy focused on connecting national payment systems and instant payment platforms is anticipated to be pushed during this summit. 

Rupay-MIR Card linkage: According to various publications, including the Economic Times and Russia focused trackers, India and Russia have agreed in principle to link India’s RuPay card network with Russia’s MIR system. Once operational, a Russian tourist in Goa using a MIR card or an Indian business traveller in Moscow using RuPay should be able to pay directly in local currency, without routing every transaction through Visa/Mastercard and Western banks.

UPI-SBP (fast payments) bridge: UPI, India’s real time digital payments backbone, and Russia’s SBP (System for Fast Payments) were discussed during External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar’s recent visit to Moscow. According to Russia’s Pivot to Asia, this would allow users of national payment systems to execute near-instant cross-border transfers that are paid directly between Indian and Russian banks. 

Honoured to call on President Putin of Russia in Moscow today.

Conveyed greetings of Prime Minister @narendramodi.

Apprised him of preparations underway for the upcoming Annual India Russia Summit. Also discussed regional and global developments.

Deeply value his… pic.twitter.com/2cUdIQVrrj

— Dr. S. Jaishankar (@DrSJaishankar) November 18, 2025

If PM Modi and President Putin can declare even an initial framework or pilot for this payments system, it would signify a tremendous shift. Rather than fighting every new sanctions package on its own, India and Russia would be constructing a parallel banking infrastructure that gradually diminishes reliance on SWIFT and US-centric card networks.

For India, this is not about “de-dollarisation” chants. It is about insurance. In a world where sanctions and bank blacklisting have become normal measures, having a lasting alternative payments network with important partners is element of national security as vital as tanks and missiles, but considerably less visible. 

From oil heavy to balanced: Fixing a broken trade relationship

India-Russia trade has expanded in value, but not in balance. As to MEA and commerce ministry data, bilateral trade touched around $68-69 billion in 2024/25, compared to barely $11-13 billion a few years earlier. The main driver has been low cost Russian crude, which Indian refiners have imported in considerable numbers since 2022.

The problem is that Indian exports have hardly changed, locked at roughly $4.9 billion, while imports from Russia (oil, fertilisers, coal, metals) have risen to nearly $64 billion, leaving India with a large trade deficit. That mismatch is unsustainable in the long term, both economically and politically. 

Recent weeks have witnessed a marked shift in tone from Moscow. In interviews and briefings, Russian authorities have openly acknowledged the mismatch and stated desire to grow imports from India and improve market access. Reuters and Indian newspapers quote Dmitry Peskov as that Russia wants to “address India’s concerns on trade deficit” and make trade more strong and “shielded from third country influence”.

Officials in India have been setting the foundation. In November, the 26th meeting of the India-Russia Working Group on Trade and Economic Cooperation met in Moscow to review market access and regulatory impediments for Indian pharma, agricultural products, engineering items and services. Simultaneously, negotiations on a comprehensive free trade agreement have been restarted between India and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which comprises Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan. An 18-month negotiation roadmap and terms of reference have apparently been finalised by the ministry of commerce. 

26th Meeting of the India-Russia Working Group on Trade & Economic Cooperation Read More