PM Modi starts 3-nation tour to Jordan, Oman and Ethiopia: Read how India’s relations with these nations underscore business, credibility and co-operation

On December 15, 2025, Prime Minister Narendra Modi embarked on a four-day, three-nation tour to Jordan (Dec.15-16), Ethiopia (Dec.16-17), and Oman (Dec.17-18). His itinerary is carefully planned to connect the institutional core of Africa with the stability belt of West Asia.

Over the next three days, will be going to Jordan, Ethiopia and Oman. These are three valued partners with whom India has age-old civilisational ties and strong bilateral relations.https://t.co/QSkwR9m6IZ

— Narendra Modi (@narendramodi) December 15, 2025

Deepening commerce, securing energy corridors, expanding development partnerships, and engaging the diaspora are all familiar concepts on one level. The true strategic significance, however, is found in the subtle layering, India’s capacity to (a) forge cooperative relationships across political divides in a volatile region, (b) establish a “Global South” narrative in the capital of the African Union, and (c) convert long-standing Gulf partnerships into the next wave of trade, defence sustainment, and green energy agreements.

Jordan: A gateway state, and a diplomacy multiplier

When Modi arrives in Amman on December 15, he will meet with the Indian community and have one on one and delegation-level discussions with King Abdullah II. The following day, he will accompany the King to an India-Jordan business event. A trip to Petra with the Crown Prince (weather allowing) is a noteworthy symbolic and strategic contribution. This cultural diplomacy gesture also supports the story of ancient India-Levant trade connections while maintaining a non-confrontational and civilizational public messaging.

The underappreciated economic narrative is that Jordan is a high-utility trading partner rather than a “headline” one. The MEA briefing highlights bilateral trade of about USD 2.8 billion, Jordan’s position as a major supplier of fertilizers (phosphates and potash), and the flagship Jordan India Fertilizer Company (JIFCO) joint venture (IFFCO-JPMC) with an investment of USD 860 million exactly the kind of supply-security relationship that is more important during periods of calm than during global commodity spikes. Indian clothing enterprises in Jordan’s designated industrial zones are also quietly significant because they provide a workable foundation for jobs and manufacturing connected to India without the politics that frequently accompany large scale initiatives.

Connectivity is a second subtle but significant advancement. Jordan is facilitating travel with e-visa moves and visa on arrival/tourist facilitation. Royal Jordanian has started direct flights between Amman and Mumbai and plans to expand to New Delhi. These actions may seem “routine,” but they are important in diplomacy because they transform goodwill into repeated people to people movement, such as business, tourism, and student exchange, without the need for a big strategic declaration.

#WATCH | PM @narendramodi’s three-nation visit begins with a visit to Jordan on Monday. He will hold bilateral and delegation-level talks with King Abdullah II ibn Al Hussein in Amman and jointly address the India–Jordan Business Forum.

PM Modi will also interact with the Indian… pic.twitter.com/HoEIHuaXOY

— DD News (@DDNewslive) December 14, 2025

The MEA briefing specifically mentions cooperation, including India’s involvement in initiatives like the Aqaba Process, and highlights the King’s outreach to India following the April 2025 Pahalgam terror attack. Jordan’s value in terms of security is that it is a pragmatic regional actor with established counter terror engagement. This is significant because Jordan has the potential to act as a quiet amplifier for India’s counterterrorism messaging in regional and international platforms, particularly those where India frequently encounters narrative conflict.

Geographically, Jordan is situated near the region’s fault-line issues Israel-Palestine, Syria spillovers, and wider West Asian security but it is also a potential land-bridge node in the idea of the India Middle East Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), which is commonly described as connecting India to Europe via the Gulf and continuing through Jordan in the northern segment. India benefits from maintaining corridor logic by consistent bilateral interaction with corridor-relevant governments, particularly those that can communicate with various sides without being perceived as maximalist, even when a regional crisis disrupts IMEC’s pace.

Ethiopia: Africa’s diplomatic capital, reform momentum, and India’s Global South credibility

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed invited Modi to make a state visit to Ethiopia from Jordan on December 16-17. According to the MEA, this is the first time an Indian prime minister will visit Ethiopia since 2011. Bilateral discussions, engagement with the Indian community, and a particularly high-profile event, an address to a joint session of Ethiopia’s Parliament, are all part of the itinerary.

Ethiopia is important strategically due to its institutional centrality as well as its geographic location. The African Union’s headquarters are in Addis Ababa, and India’s own perspective is to view Africa as a co-architect of global governance rather than a recipient region, particularly after the African Union joined the G20 permanently in 2023. India’s assertion that its ‘Voice of Global South’ stance is supported by elite political attention rather than merely conference rhetoric is strengthened by a PM-level visit to the AU’s capital. 

The MEA briefing specifically states that Ethiopia has started extensive economic reforms, including opening important sectors like banking and capital markets, and India is seeking to match development cooperation and economic engagement with Ethiopia’s priorities. This is an underappreciated aspect of Ethiopia. Practically speaking, that can result in Indian involvement in mining, infrastructure, IT, manufacturing, and agriculture, all of which the MEA states are anticipated to be discussed. Instead of attempting to outspend competitors in cheque diplomacy, Indian businesses may compete on capacity building + technology + affordability at this kind of entry point.

The basics of investing and trading are also subtly significant. The MEA briefing lists more than 175 Indian businesses operating in Ethiopia. It also mentions that India buys pulses and beans, with bilateral commerce of about USD 550 million, while medicines account for nearly 40% of India’s exports to Ethiopia in their reported snapshot. These specifics are important because they demonstrate a relationship that is already driven by the ‘real economy’ of health supply chains, food security, and business ties at the SME level, exactly the kind of ballast that endures political cycles.

India can also achieve long-term success in the areas of energy and climate cooperation. The International Solar Alliance’s involvement in Ethiopia, including the creation of a Solar Technology Application Resource Center (STARC) at Addis Ababa University and other solar initiatives, is highlighted in the MEA briefing. India’s “technology + training + institution-building” model may be more appealing than headline-grabbing mega-projects with high conditionalities in the present global climate finance context, where many developing governments desire clean energy growth without debt traps.

Last but not least, Ethiopia’s geopolitical layer has expanded since it became a full member of BRICS on January 1, 2024, putting it inside a significant Global South coordinating framework that also includes India as a founding member. While this does not automatically result in alignment, it does give India more opportunities to pursue convergences on development finance, payment architecture discussions, and governance reform. This is especially true if India is careful to frame the relationship as a partnership rather than bloc politics. 

Oman: The steady hand gulf partner, trade architecture and a defence sustainment subplot

At Sultan Haitham bin Tarik’s invitation, the last leg of PM Modi’s current tour will take place in Oman on December 17-18. The MEA emphasises that this is Modi’s second visit since February 2018 and coincides with the 70th anniversary of diplomatic ties. A thorough review with the Sultan, meetings with business executives, and a speech to the Indian community are all part of the Oman visit. Several documents are reportedly nearing completion.

The trade agreement track is the most significant, underrated development. India expresses hope regarding the India-Oman Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) in the MEA’s special briefing, stating that teams are working toward early finalisation and that signing it would significantly deepen economic ties. The arrangement had advanced through late-stage procedures, according to Indian media sources before the visit, and the visit’s timing and cabinet deliberation were anticipated. If CEPA passes, it would be more than just tariff schedules; it would secure a stable framework for services, investment confidence, and supply-chain planning in a politically moderate and commercially integrated Gulf state.

Oman’s maritime location and defence access constitute its second quiet strategic value. In order to aid Indian navy ships expand operations (including anti-piracy) and fortify the strategic alliance, a 2018 annexure to the India-Oman Memorandum of Understanding on military cooperation relating to Duqm was declared in Parliament. This is significant because Duqm provides operational flexibility and logistical depth in the western Indian Ocean by being situated outside the Strait of Hormuz choke-point on the Arabian Sea side.

Aircraft sustainment is a third underrated strand that is extremely technical yet strategically significant. In response to inquiries, the MEA briefing stated that Oman’s air force has retired its Jaguar aircraft and is prepared to transfer replacement parts, with deliveries anticipated in the next few days. This is not ‘headline diplomacy,’ but it does directly help fleet maintenance and readiness, an illustration of how India’s Gulf ties are becoming more and more hard-power logistical without being perceived as overt militarisation. 

Energy continues to be the obvious pillar; the MEA briefing highlights ongoing hydrocarbon cooperation and the fact that India imports LNG, petroleum products, and crude oil from Oman while also exploring green energy and energy security options. The subtlety here is that, like many Gulf economies, Oman is managing the shift from hydrocarbons to green fuels and growth driven by logistics. India gains by being positioned as a long-term supplier of current energy and a long-term partner for the transition of the future.

Lastly, the size of Oman’s diaspora provides a political buffer: according to the MEA briefing, there are more than 675,000 Indians living in Oman, acting as a ‘living bridge.’ India’s ability to keep the debate mature, skills, legal safeguards, and predictability often keeps workforce issues from escalating into diplomatic annoyances in a region where labour-market policies can generate uncertainty.

The bigger geopolitical significance: why this tour matters beyond the three capitals

When combined, Jordan, Ethiopia, and Oman form a skillfully woven arc that spans two regions where India’s interests coincide: Africa’s ascent in global markets and governance, and West Asia’s stability and energy pathways. Instead of rejecting options, the visit enhances India’s ‘multi-alignment’ narrative by creating a variety of workable options, such as diverse platforms for development funding and reform agendas, diverse logistic hubs for marine security, and diverse partners for trade and fertilizers. 

In terms of connectivity, the visit supports India’s corridor logic at a time when international trade channels are disrupted and politicized. The idea behind IMEC, which connects India to Europe via the Gulf and beyond and is sometimes portrayed as going through Jordan, demonstrates India’s efforts to develop reliable alternatives that supplement rather than replace conventional marine routes. Stable leader level diplomacy maintains the option’s credibility and keeps India in the room as the initiative picks up steam, even in situations when regional instability hinders execution. 

Ethiopia is the focal point of Global South politics. India can show that its focus on the Global South is not sporadic by having a PM visit Addis Ababa, addressing the Parliament, and participate in debates about investments and reforms. Ethiopia’s membership in BRICS gives India’s involvement a multilateral ‘echo,’ allowing for collaboration on development priorities even in the face of competition between Western and Chinese strategies. 

Jordan and Oman have significance when it comes to regional security and counterterrorism messaging because they are functional nations that communicate with a variety of audiences rather than ideological megaphones. The references in the MEA briefing, Jordan’s counterterrorism collaboration and Oman’s defence cooperation and maritime security, indicate that India is putting stability, operational cooperation, and trustworthy alliances ahead of rhetorical point-scoring. Additionally, by promoting de-escalation and stability, this stance aids India in maintaining its delicate balance in West Asia strategic connections with Israel and close ties with Arab partners.

Conclusion

The path taken between Jordan, Ethiopia, and Oman is ultimately best understood as “quiet statecraft” with tangible benefits. Bolstering vital supply chains like fertilisers and bolstering counterterrorism coordination with a steady regional pivot (Jordan), strengthening India’s Global South credibility in the capital of the African Union while aligning with a reforming economy (Ethiopia), and transforming a long-standing Gulf partnership into next-generation outcomes trade architecture, maritime access, energy security, and defence sustainment (Oman). When taken as a whole, the tour portrays an India that is building coalitions, corridors, and capabilities rather than chasing headlines, reducing the risk of trade routes, expanding strategic options in West Asia and the western Indian Ocean, and maintaining the credibility of India’s development-first diplomacy in a world of sharper blocs and precarious supply lines.