Opinion: Collateral Damage, No Regret: Indian Sailor Killings And India-US Equation

Three Indian mariners on a merchant ship off the coast of Iran and Oman are killed by the US Navy, but the US did not think it politically appropriate to express regret at this loss of life. Whatever the circumstances that led to this killing, some words of regret from the US would have been normal. After all, the merchant ship was unarmed and was not posing any military threat to the US warship. The US used military force against it, knowing that civilian casualties could result. Even if there was no deliberate intention to inflict casualties, but "collateral damage" occurred, why not express regret? Is there no moral obligation to condone the death of civilians in a military action, particularly against a non-military target? What is worse in this case is that India is a comprehensive global strategic partner of the US. Both countries have cooperated for many years to promote maritime security in the Indian Ocean. The two countries regularly hold elaborate naval exercises. Both are members of the Quad, along with Japan and Australia, which has, amongst its several tasks, maritime security in the Indo-Pacific area. Maritime domain awareness is another major area of cooperation between the two countries. A US officer is stationed in our Information Fusion Centre- Indian Ocean region (IFC-IOR) in Gurugram, which is a maritime security and intelligence sharing hub established by the Indian Navy. It actively collaborates with international partners to monitor shipping traffic and combat threats across the region. India maintains a reciprocal liaison officer in the US Central Command HQs in Florida as part of deepening maritime, counterterrorism, and undersea domain awareness cooperation with the US. The Gulf area falls under the US Central Command and not the US Indo-Pacific Command. It is, therefore, surprising that with such levels of institutional cooperation, the likelihood of a very large number of Indian crews on commercial vessels being physically endangered in an area which is the biggest source of supply of oil and gas not only to India but to Asia in general was not discussed, and some protocols to protect their lives were not devised. Iran's step to control the flow of commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, however objectionable or legally questionable it may be, was in response to the US/Israeli war on Iran. Before the attack, the passage through the Strait was free, even when relations between Iran and the US had been hostile, and Iran had been subject to draconian sanctions by the US. The US violated the UN Charter in attacking Iran. The US policy of oil and other sanctions on Iran and imposing them on third countries if they disregard these sanctions has no basis in international law. The US may have political reasons to sanction Iran because of its regional policies or its nuclear programme, but that does not mean that the US is acting in accordance with international law or the UN Charter. The US is exercising its power unilaterally because it has the muscle to do so. Accordingly, the US blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and the prevention of Iran from exporting oil constituted unilateral decisions by the US. Commercial shipping would have no legal obligation to adhere to the blockade, though prudence would demand a careful assessment of the physical risks of violating it, given the deployment of US naval forces in the area. If individual ships, for whatever reason, felt that they could run the risk of passing through the Strait of Hormuz, they would not be acting illegally -- they would simply be risk-taking in defying US orders. If the commercial vessels were shutting off their transponders, etc., to breach the blockade, the question arises as to who gave the US the legal authority to act against them. As it happens, the US has not formally declared war against Iran. On top of it, under the US Constitution, the power to declare war lies with Congress and Trump's military action against Iran without Congressional approval is an issue of contention in the US itself. In this background, the US Navy firing on commercial shipping in international waters would be all the more legally questionable. India's own initial reaction to the killing of our three mariners on MT Settebelo was much too circumspect. True, the vessel was not under the Indian flag, and it knowingly circumvented the US blockade, but because three Indian nationals were killed by the US Navy, this necessitated a strong reaction from us. Instead, we seemed to want to give an escape clause to the US by referring to sanctions, OFAC and the US blockade in our initial comments. We eventually condemned the attack on June 10, but without saying who was responsible. The US Navy was not named. With public anger mounting, the US C'dA was summoned the second time after the US Navy struck MT Jalveer, which also carried Indian crew members (20) but without causing any casualties. This time, we lodged a strong protest against the continuing attacks by US naval forces on commercial vessels carrying Indian sailors in the Gulf of Oman, which, we recalled, had already resulted in the tragic and avoidable loss of three Indian lives. The MEA once again conveyed its deep concern over the use of lethal and deadly force against civilian shipping, adding that "such actions are unacceptable and undermine the safety, security and stability of international maritime commerce in a sensitive region at a difficult time". The US C'dA was requested to convey India's strong concerns to its authorities and to ensure that US forces operating in the region took all necessary measures to prevent the loss of civilian life. The government obviously felt that, with the US ambassador out of the country, summoning the C'dA was not enough and that our concerns had to be communicated at the political level. External Affairs Minister Jaishankar spoke to US Secretary of State Rubio and reiterated India's strong protest at the attacks by the US Navy in the Gulf that killed three Indian mariners, stating that such lethal actions against commercial shipping were not justified. Rather surprisingly, Rubio's read-out of the exchange with Jaishankar was unusually harsh and peremptory. He said that he stressed to EAM that all commercial vessels should immediately comply with orders from US forces, which seek to uphold peace and security in the Strait. He underscored that violations of the US blockade and the illicit transport of Iranian oil will not be tolerated. Rubio implicitly not only justified the killing of three Indian mariners under the circumstances but also warned that this could happen again, as the US will not tolerate the violation of its unilaterally imposed blockade. There is not even a pro forma expression of regret at the killing of nationals of a friendly country. A wiser diplomatic approach would have dictated some balancing of a tough message asserting the fundamentals of the US position with the palliative of regret. But Rubio preferred to snub us. As for the US upholding peace and security in the Strait, one can argue that, whatever the sins of Iran, it is the US that has disturbed peace and security in the Strait by its initial attacks on Iran. The irony of Rubio's message to India is that two days after his unyielding message, Trump announced the lifting of the US blockade of the Strait of Hormuz following a preliminary agreement with Iran. Rubio would have been aware of this imminent initial breakthrough, and yet he wrong-footed himself by phrasing his response to Jaishankar's oral demarche in such insensitive and unacceptable terms. In the circumstances, Prime Minister Narendra Modi was right in raising the issue of the safety of seafarers in his G7 statement, with Trump listening. He raised the issue more directly with Trump in their bilateral meeting, reminding the US president of the safety of lakhs of Indian seafarers on commercial ships. Trump regrettably side-stepped the issue by vaguely referring to such eventualities. He too missed an opportunity to express some regret at the killing of Indian nationals by his forces by wrapping it in a re-statement of the basic position of the US on the blockade. He talked of protecting India but was indifferent to the protection of Indian seafarers. (Kanwal Sibal was Foreign Secretary and Ambassador to Turkey, Egypt, France and Russia, and Deputy Chief Of Mission in Washington.) Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author